"Exploring Federalism and Integration – the EU, Taiwan, China and Korea”

Berlin, 26 October 2002

The title of this paper, assigned to me by the organizers of this conference, assumes a direction of development across the Taiwan Strait that would appear ideal. Perhaps it is the European experience of integration, which seeks to handle matters of common interest while allowing each state to maintain its unique identity, that leads one to suggest perhaps such a model might be useful when contemplating the future relationship between Taiwan and mainland China.

I would suggest that the European experience and such assumptions are useful in the following ways: The European experience, still in development, brings about new concepts in the definition of state “sovereignty,” a core issue of contention across the Strait. The European experience also offers a successful example of reconciling historical amities and the psychological impact of war. The fact that the European Union as we know today began with trade and economic integration before the supra-governmental political structure was conceived also sheds light on the process we are trying to pursue across the Taiwan Strait. And most importantly, European integration and current efforts at enlargement respects the free will of the participating parties – democratic mechanisms are in place to ensure the stability and sustainability of the integration process.

Indeed, while maintaining their distinct cultural, linguistic, political and even military identities, with this integration process Europeans are bound together by a common fate: the strength of the Euro and the common market, and the stability of the region; in short, common peace and prosperity. Yet we can also expand this concept to a larger global context. A major problem or conflict in any part of the world would have adverse effects on others. From terrorism to forest fires, an event in one corner of the world could send stock markets plummeting and affect living conditions in other parts of the world.

So yes, to some extent, we are all bound together be a common fate, and ideally there would be effective regional or global mechanisms to both identify and deal with the common interests. Before we can arrive at building a global mechanism, we must examine how, on a local or regional level, we can bridge certain existing gaps. It is useful to start by looking at the reality of “separate identities,” and finding the characteristics in those identities that may allow a certain level of integration without compromising other areas of uniqueness in which separation is preferred. One must note that, as the European experience demonstrates, sometimes a respect for uniqueness and separation is necessary to find harmony and commonality.

The separation and integration of identities in the cross-strait scenario are very complex. It is a challenge to be sensitive to the minor details of histories, nationalistic emotions, practical policy options and current language of interaction while at the same time keep in perspective the broader global trends. Nevertheless, this paper will seek to provide an overview of the development of “identity politics” in the context of cross-strait relations. Then I will examine the existing mechanisms and obstacles for dealing with these identities, and expectations for the direction in which these identities might develop in the future.

The evolution of identity politics in Taiwan

Several months ago, during the parliament’s interpellation sessions, once legislator asked an official responsible for cross-strait policy, “are you Chinese or Taiwanese?” The answer was threefold: “Politically, I am a Republic of Chinese; ethnically I am Chinese; emotionally I am Taiwanese.” This answer goes to show how complex politics of national identity are in Taiwan.

National identity has been a very emotional and contentious issue for a long time. Over recent years and throughout Taiwan’s democratization process, concepts of national identity have been through significant transformations, and the dynamics of identity politics between various groups in Taiwan have also shifted. Through democratic mechanisms, historical differences in national identity are debated, argued emotionally at times, but then also merging toward consensus today. Yet consensus building within the Taiwan political system is not without complications. It is a dynamic process that involves multiple facets of our interaction with a rapidly changing mainland China. It also involves a complicated web of history, domestic politics, economic interests, and security concerns.

In the early years of the KMT administration’s arrival in Taiwan from mainland China, the fostering of a Chinese national identity was a key part of their governance. In fact, the very legitimacy of the KMT rule in Taiwan relied on the creation of a Chinese nationalist identity. Taking over the governance of Taiwan after fifty years of Japanese colonization, and dealing with the aftermath of a bloody 1947 confrontation with native Taiwanese, the KMT government found itself in a precarious situation. Aside from implementing an iron-fist authoritarian order with state terrorism (the period we now call “white terror,”) the KMT sought to maintain control in Taiwan by conditioning the public psychology with an orthodox Chinese national identity. The people were taught that they were the true Chinese, in contrast to the “bandits” that governed the mainland, the legitimate inheritors of Chinese civilization and that the KMT was the rightful ruler of China. All vestiges of Japanese colonial identity as well as promotion of a unique Taiwan identity were quashed. For many years, the Taipei government was in competition with the Beijing government over legitimate representation of China.

As the rest of the world shifted to Beijing in recognition and Taiwan became internationally isolated, the KMT was compelled to seek domestic sources of legitimization and chose a path of “nativization,” or “Taiwanization,” incorporating native Taiwanese into its leadership and beginning to enact policies that would give native Taiwanese more room for political activity.

Thus the shift in the KMT’s national identity ideology came along with political democratization and liberalization.

At the same time, long deprived of the right to speak up on alternatives to the old Chinese nationalist identity the government propagated, opposition activists organized into the DPP, with a vocal agenda for a distinct Taiwan identity that would not only give greater voice to the majority native Taiwanese, but also terminate the competition for legitimate representation of China in the international arena. The growth of the DPP in the late 80’s and early 90’s presented a challenge to the KMT, which turned to further Taiwanization, adopting a similar platform. This period coincided with mainland China’s opening up and economic modernization. More travel and interaction across the Taiwan Strait brought about greater awareness of the distinctive political and economic systems between the two sides, serving to further consolidate the new Taiwan identity in society.

The growing Taiwan identity alarmed Beijing, which began to step up efforts to counter this trend, selecting a tactic of military threat and further diplomatic isolation. This tactic was effective in fostering international pressure against an outright declaration of Taiwan independence. However, it has also offended the Taiwan public and flamed further antagonisms to the extent that today, most residents of Taiwan would reject unification. In other words, while Beijing has successfully prevented a declaration of Taiwan independence, the antagonistic politics and military threats have not been conducive to bridging a national identity gap across the Strait.

Chinese national identity

While the formation of a Taiwan identity has much to do with history and the evolution of politics both within Taiwan and across the Strait, the Chinese nationalism we see exhibited today is equally complex. When it comes to the Taiwan question, there is an inherent dilemma in Chinese nationalism. While the Chinese people exhibit much arrogance in being part of one of the world’s greatest civilizations and becoming a regional power, at the same time the Chinese are extremely insecure about the history of foreign invasion and colonization. This dilemma is manifested in actual policy and action: Chinese national identity is both inclusive and exclusive.

The view from the center of China seeks to include various ethnic groups residing on PRC territory, from Tibetans to Uigurs, Mongolians and other minorities, as well as so-called “breakaway” territories like Taiwan, in molding a common “Chineseness.” With much confidence in the greatest of China, they find it inconceivable that anyone would prefer an identity that is non-Chinese. At the same time, the view from central China could also be exclusive: they are very suspicious of foreign intentions and sometimes see the development of separate national identities, for example the Tibetan and Taiwan independence movements, as designs of foreign countries aiming to carve up China. For example, US weapons sales to Taiwan, while seen from the Taiwan perspective as a response to Chinese threats against the island, would in some Chinese nationalist perspectives become US efforts to prevent China’s unification. Thus China sees its arms buildup as justifiable in the sense of defending territory against foreign intervention.

Interaction of identity politics across the Taiwan Strait

The reality of separation across the Taiwan Strait for over a century has enabled various national identities to develop within different historical and political contexts. Towards the mid 1980’s, when the two political systems allowed interaction to take place, the collision of different identities also fostered new ones. Apparently, nationalism and national identity are very fluid and dynamic, giving us the possibility to influence future evolution through certain policy choices. Indeed, there are a number of mechanisms in place, many of which have been mentioned by other speakers throughout this conference, and there are also some obstacles and challenges.

Obstacle 1: “One China” issue

The issue of “one China” remains a point of contention across the Taiwan Strait.

There are two dimensions of this issue. The first dimension relates to the content of “one China,” and the second dimension is process. There are disagreements over what “one China” means. In essence, is China a political term, a cultural term, a geographical term, or a conceptual term? Is there any room at all for different interpretations across the Strait, or should the term be left ambiguous and not interpreted at all? Then there is the procedural contention. Does the principle come before dialogue, or can dialogue take place before agreement on principle? The PRC insists that acceptance of “one China” be a precondition to any official dialogue across the Strait, while the Taiwan government believes that dialogue should take place without preconditions, and that if “one China” is so important for the PRC, it should be laid out on the table instead as an issue for discussion. Along this line, President Chen Shui-bian explicitly said that the leaders on two sides should use their wisdom and creativity to “jointly deal with the issue of a future one China.” Thus far we do not see any indications that either side is willing to compromise on the question of “one China” first or dialogue first, and therefore it would be difficult to foresee any official dialogue.

Obstacle 2: International representation

Most of the people of Taiwan, across the lines of political parties, seek greater international representation in the form of participation in international governmental organizations and diplomatic relations with other countries. Facing difficulties in these two areas, Taiwan’s diplomatic efforts are complemented by civil society and NGO action to get Taiwan integrated into the world. The PRC, however, sees Taiwan’s international representation as an infringement on its “one China” principle and adamantly intervenes to block Taiwan’s access to the international community. Such efforts are aimed at depriving Taiwan of any vestige of “statehood” in the international arena, and positioning Taiwan as a “local” part of China when it comes to international recognition. The points of contention are obvious in the following two questions: 1. Are the Taiwanese identity and Chinese identity mutual exclusive in the international arena? 2. Must the Taiwanese identity necessarily be a subordinate part of a higher Chinese identity, or is there a possibility for parity?

Obstacle 3: Military threat

The third main obstacle to reconciling identities is the military buildup that is taking places on both sides of the Strait. China’s military modernization has meant significant growths in military budget, some of it utilized in the deployment of missiles directly across the Strait and the procurement of other weapons targeted against Taiwan. In response, Taiwan is also increasing the volume of its procurement of defense weapons in three main areas: Anti-blockade, anti-missile, and preventing unconventional warfare. The arms buildup is costly and in the interest of neither side. But the action-reaction pattern is turning into a vicious cycle that generates more hostility.

Mechanisms for overcoming the obstacles

The above three areas are the fundamental impediments to reaching a formula that would reconcile the different identities across the Strait. In the following I will outline some mechanisms that may contribute to resolving the differences, though I would also argue that the process could be very slow. Some of the mechanisms have also been used in the Taiwan domestic context, and even there national identities are not fully and comfortably reconciled. It could be much more difficult in the cross-strait scenario. Nevertheless, the possibilities are certainly worth exploring.

1. Trade and economic interaction

Trade across the Taiwan Strait has been growing at a rapid rate. This brings about opportunities as well as anxieties, as addressed extensively by other presenters in this conference. But despite the anxiety dimension of greater economic integration, I think most would agree that more economic engagement across the Taiwan Strait would provide a foundation for mutual understanding and recognition of common interests. And as the European experience shows us, common economic interests could possibly lead to a framework for discussion of common political and security interests. They core challenge on this at the moment is how to normalize the trading relationship. On this there are two current projects:

a. Enabling direct links across the Strait, specifically direct transportation links. This is a rare area in which we find a high degree of consensus between the DPP and the CCP. The question is how to proceed in the absence of official dialogue. Given the recognition that the obstacle to official dialogue, the “one China” issue, will not be resolved in the immediate future, any progress would require flexibility in the political language as well as the format through which links will be negotiated.

b. Working through existing trade dispute settlement mechanisms like the WTO. Both Taiwan and mainland China have acceded to the World Trade Organization. So far, the PRC has refused to bring cross-strait trade issues to the WTO, but I think it is an option worth contemplation because: 1. In the absence of a working official mechanism across the Strait to deal with the existing trade issues, the WTO provides an ideal framework with recognized rules for settling disputes. 2. PRC willingness to deal with Taiwan through internationally-accepted norms would help to alleviate contention over obstacle #2 I have described above, mainly on the question of giving recognition to Taiwan’s existence as an international entity. Such a gesture, though limited to settling trade disputes, is a measure that would contribute to the gradual building of political goodwill and confidence.

2. Creating new political language and redefining political symbols

The political symbol that is at the core of cross-strait political dispute is sovereignty. “Sovereignty” permeates political, diplomatic, and military conflict, and therefore it is important to find ways to deal with this highly contentious symbol. By “dealing with” this symbol, I do not mean “solving” the issue. In fact, I think it is premature at this point, given the existence of different identities and the lack of mutual confidence, to expect either side to willingly compromise in their respective views on sovereignty. There are two possible ways to deal with the problem: 1. Redefine sovereignty; and 2. Sidestep sovereignty.

a. Redefine sovereignty. Taking a look at the broader trends in the world, one may find that the traditional boundaries of sovereign states are being redefined. In the era of globalization, matters of “common fate,” including the environment, trade and prosperity, and security are being moved into the supra-state context – the European Union is the best example. This concept may be decades away from realization, but would sovereign states cease to be the dominant unit of international trade, political and security activity in the future? This is a grand project involving a revolution in traditional concepts of international law and diplomacy – not the most practical suggestion at the moment, but nevertheless worth keeping in mind as a direction of evolution.

b. Sidestep sovereignty. One way to deal with sovereignty is recognize that it will not be “solved” immediately, and instead find new language to sidestep the symbol. We are witnessing some useful developments in this direction. For example, recognizing that official dialogue across the Strait will not resume in the near future, President Chen indicated a willingness to authorize non-official institutions to engage in negotiations around direct transportation links. This gives the PRC room to sidestep the symbolic “one China” precondition on official talks. The PRC has also made a constructive effort to be creative on language, offering terminology such as “cross-strait links” to replace the phrase “domestic links.” Of course in the absence of mutual trust, both sides appear to be cautiously waiting for indications of consistency, but this is nevertheless a positive start.

3. Military CBM’s

Over the years there has been some discussion toward military confidence-building measures, in attempts to lower the likelihood of conflict that arises from misjudgment, misunderstanding and misinterpretation of a crisis situation. The implementation of such a suggestion has been stagnant, due to the political conditions. However, given the alarming rate of arms buildup across the Strait, the potential for disaster is also increasing. Some form of military CBM’s would be key to easing tensions. Individuals have proposed that the PLA withdraw its short-range ballistic missiles out of the Nanjing military zone, the area directly across the Taiwan Strait, as a gesture of goodwill but also a practical step to building confidence.

4. The case for democracy

With democratization in Taiwan, we see the politics of national identity argued and debated contentiously sometimes. However, it is the fact that the issues find free expression that enables consensus building. Indeed, despite contentious argument, the main political forces in Taiwan have come to agree on a number of key areas regarding the country’s identity: The desire for greater international space, a position of economic engagement with mainland China, a tendency to favor the status quo in political relations, a willingness to defend Taiwan against a Chinese military threat, and common opposition to “one country, two systems” formula the PRC as presented. Given the complicated social and political conditions that have produced different identities in Taiwan, society has done well in avoiding bloodshed and violent conflict in the process of dynamic power transitions. Thus most Taiwanese people not only appreciate democracy but attach great significance to democratic institutions as the mechanisms for voicing but also reconciling differences. So far we have not seen much progress in democratization in China, but there is an expectation on Taiwan’s part that any ultimate political resolution of cross-strait relations would take place under a democratic framework. Democratization in China would be conducive to cross-strait relations in at least the following ways:

a. Creation of a system of political values that are common with Taiwan’s. This would enable the two sides to jointly identify more areas of common interest.

b. Enabling a rational and transparent decision-making process, providing predictability and room for public participation.

c. Under a democratic and free society, different identities can coexist in an atmosphere that respects diversity.

d. Many people assume that a democratic China would be less willing to use force against Taiwan and instead, resort to dialogue and communication in resolving differences.

To have a greater role in promoting democracy, we are in the process of establishing the Taiwan Democracy Foundation, as a counterpart to other democracy-support institutions around the world, and as a basis for our involvement in creating democratic mechanisms outside of Taiwan – mainland China included.

Conclusion:

By reviewing the evolution of identity changes within Taiwan, examining the challenges to resolving differences in cross-strait relations, and then looking into possible mechanisms, I am lead to the following conclusions:

1. National identities are built by social and political conditions over history, and it takes time to remold and reconcile. Attempts at immediate resolutions or intervention of force may backfire to create more complications. As in the European experience, it may be useful to star an integration process through economic and practical interests before the more sensitive political matters are tackled.

2. In order to have a harmonious common fate, it is important to respect differences in the process. In the case of cross-strait relations, some Chinese recognition of Taiwan identity and the history that created this identity would be crucial in reconciling the hostilities. Attempts at elimination, degradation and localization would only backfire to generate more hostilities, fostering more differences instead of commonalities.